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Abstract:  
The interdependence of electricity and natural gas is becoming a major energy policy and regulatory 
issue in all jurisdictions around the world. The increased role of gas fired plants in renewable-based 
electricity markets and the dependence on gas imports make this issue particular striking for the Euro-
pean energy market. In this paper we provide a comprehensive combined analysis of electricity and 
natural gas infrastructure with an applied focus. We analyze different scenarios of the long-term Euro-
pean decarbonization pathways sketched out by the Energy Roadmap 2050, and identify criteria relat-
ed to electricity and/or natural gas infrastructure and the interrelation between both markets. 
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1. Introduction 
When both the German and the French energy systems were close to a breakdown on February 9th, 
2012, energy policymakers and regulators „discovered“ that electricity networks and the natural gas in-
frastructure, which had been treated independently from each other for the last decades, are closely 
interconnected. A cold spell in continental Europe sent electricity demand in France to a long-time 
high of 100 GW. In the meantime, six German nuclear power plants that previously assured cheap 
electricity exports to France had been shut down following the moratorium on nuclear power after the 
Fukushima accident in March 2011. Gas-fired combined cycle plants in the South of Germany could 
not substitute for the loss of power from the nuclear plants due to a lack of access to gas pipeline ca-
pacity. At the same time, plenty of natural gas was transported from Austria and South Germany to 
Italy (EC, 2012). While rolling blackouts could be avoided due to active demand management by the 
French operators, the issue of electricity-natural gas interdependence was launched and led to a ma-
jor enquiry by the European Commission, with concrete regulatory action most likely upcoming. 
The issue of electricity-natural gas interdependence it not specific to the one case mentioned and is 
becoming a major energy policy and regulatory issue in all jurisdictions around the world undergoing 
the transformation to a lower-carbon and/or renewables-based energy system. Naturally the issue 
rose to top priority in Japan after the closing down of nuclear power in 2011 and likewise advanced to 
center stage in North America following the „shale gas revolution“, e.g. in PJM (Sotkiewicz, 2012). Fur-
thermore, the developments of the Arab Spring and the recurrent disputes between Russia and its gas 
transit countries Belarus and the Ukraine highlighted the issue of supply security of the import de-
pendent European Union.  
Some countries and regions within the European Union currently are dependent on a very small num-
ber of suppliers, which makes them vulnerable to supply disruptions even if they are temporary. The 
South European countries (Italy and increasingly Spain) strongly depend on pipeline imports from 
North Africa (Algeria, Libya) and use liquefied natural gas (LNG) to diversify their supplies and re-
spond to short-term demand spikes. The Central and South East European countries import almost 
exclusively from Russia and the current network topology does not allow them to quickly change this 
import pattern. For this region, storage and especially reverse flow capacities (to import from the West 
to the East, opposite the traditional direction from the East / Russia to the West) are put forward as 
remedies to increase their security of supply, in addition to increasing the number of import routes. 
The European Commission has stipulated these measures in its Supply Security Directive (EU, 2004), 
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which also guided its decisions on the TEN-E and EEPR project support (EU, 2006, 2009) and are 
picked up by the Ten-Year Network Development Plans of the natural gas transmission system opera-
tors in Europe (e.g. ENTSO-G, 2011). 
Also, the continuing deployment of intermittent capacities of renewable energy sources (RES) in the 
electricity sector is supposed to increase the role of natural gas as fuel option. The European Com-
mission (EC) states in the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 that gas “will be critical for the transformation of 
the energy system” as electricity production from gas has the lowest emissions compared to other fos-
sil-based technologies and will help reach the climate goals (EC, 2011a). Although the production of 
electricity from gas is projected to decline in the future as the influence of renewable energy sources 
increases, gas is assumed to be the major fossil fuel for electricity generation in the coming years (EC, 
2011b). 
Summarizing all those relevant aspects in both markets, it becomes evident that a combined assess-
ment is needed to derive solid recommendations about the future development of the European ener-
gy markets. However, most model-based analyses thus far have only focused on a single sector. A 
large stream of literature has addressed the development of electricity markets and networks in the 
wake of an increased share of RES (e.g. Neuhoff et al., 2008; Egerer et al., 2012). Studies like ECF 
(2011), Haller et al. (2012) and SRU (2010) determine possible development paths for the European 
electricity system. Investment needs in grid and generation infrastructure, based on renewable targets 
and potentials, is determined mostly in a cost-minimizing or welfare-maximizing way. In most models 
that determine European grid development, the electricity grid infrastructure is mostly modeled with a 
low spatial resolution and electricity-specifics, like loop flows, are not taken into account. Several pa-
pers address the market structure and development of the European and global natural gas markets 
(e.g. Egging et al., 2008, 2010). Finally, large scale energy system and macroeconomic models as 
well as technically-oriented simulation and optimization models cover the interrelation between fuel 
markets and the economy as a whole, but in an aggregated manner. These models often lack details 
of the transmission system (e.g. Capros et al., 1997; Paltsev et al., 2005; Möst and Perlwitz, 2009; 
IPTS, 2010; Capros, 2010), 
Literature relating to an integrated analysis of electricity and natural gas network markets is scarce 
and so far mostly addresses methodological and technical aspects of how to combine both markets in 
a model framework with small test cases to highlight the applicability or derive stylized insights. For 
example, Unsihuay et al. (2007) model an integrated gas-electricity system with the goal of minimizing 
the short-term system operation cost by examining a test case network based on the Belgian gas grid. 
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Another approach is the hub system applied by Arnold and Anderson (2008) which decomposes a 
power flow optimization problem for gas and electricity to model larger applications. Abrell and Weigt 
(2012) combine both markets within a partial equilibrium representation. Their model is applied to a 
European test case and shows that upstream and downstream influences between these sectors exist 
both in terms of price and quantity interactions. Furthermore, they show that effects and interactions of 
changes in the respective markets are not geographically limited but extend beyond the point of dis-
turbance due to the loop-flow characteristics in the electricity market. 
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive combined analysis of electricity and natural gas infrastruc-
ture issues with an applied focus and a complete dataset covering the European networks. Following 
the approach of Abrell and Weigt (2012) of combining both markets in an equilibrium setting, we ana-
lyze different scenarios of the long-term European decarbonization pathways sketched out by the En-
ergy Roadmap 2050 and by the EMF28 effort on “The Effects of Technology Choices on EU Climate 
Policy”.1 We identify critical issues related to electricity and/or natural gas infrastructure and the inter-
relation between both markets. The next section describes the initial model used and the extensions 
that have been made to address certain scenarios for the European decarbonization process. The 
network topology of the electric and natural gas infrastructure, respectively, the data and other as-
sumptions are also discussed. Section 3 describes the results of the basic model runs, section 4 dis-
cusses the effects of different load and generation conditions on the electricity market, section 5 dis-
cusses the impact of gas market disruptions on the electricity system, and section 6 summarizes and 
concludes. 
 
2. Model and Parameterization 
 The model 2.1.
The model in this paper allows for a combined natural gas and electricity sector representation, both 
taking into account the respective sector’s transmission grid and how they can be run independently of 
one another or in a combined manner (Figure 1). The natural gas model, which is shown on the left 
hand side of Figure 1, depicts pipelines and LNG routes as a multi-commodity network. The arcs in 
the pipeline network are directed, i.e. the natural gas flows in a predetermined direction given by the 
                                                     
1 http://emf.stanford.edu/research/emf_28_the_effects_of_technology_choices_on_eu_climate_policy/ 
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compressor stations in the pipeline network. Possible LNG routes are implicitly defined via exogenous-
ly given export (liquefaction) and import (regasification) capacities. Natural gas producers offer the ex-
tracted gas at the supply market to either an LNG operator or a trader, in a similar setting than in Eg-
ging (2010). While LNG traders sell the gas on the destination market to a trader, traders demand the 
services of transporting the gas to the final demand from the pipeline operator. Final consumers de-
mand the gas at that market and pay a price which includes the transport fees. If the natural gas mod-
el is run independently from the electricity model, final demand includes the demand by the electricity 
generators using natural gas fired power plants.  
The electricity model, which is depicted on the right side of Figure 1, includes the transmission grid us-
ing a DC-loadflow approach (Schweppe et al., 1988, Leuthold et al., 2012) and a market hub system 
(Hobbs, 2001). Electricity generators sell electricity to network operators who serve final consumers. 
As long as the electricity model is used independently of the natural gas model, all fuel prices are ex-
ogenous.  
The two models are combined by including the fuel linkage: the demand of natural gas fired power 
plants becomes an endogenous variable in the natural gas model and the natural gas price an endog-
enous variable in the electricity model.  
A complete mathematical model description is given in Abrell and Weigt (2012). The approach used 
here is static in the sense that we solve the models for one representative hour and storage is neither 
included in the electricity nor in the natural gas market. Furthermore, we assume perfect competition 
in all markets and complete information of all agents about all variables, i.e. the model is deterministic. 
Finally, the cross-price elasticity of natural gas and electricity final demand is assumed to be zero, i.e. 
the final demand for the energy commodities is independent. The two sub-models, as well as the 
combined one, are formulated as Mixed Complementarity Problems in GAMS (Brooke et al., 2008) 
and solved using the PATH solver (Ferris and Munson, 2000). 
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Figure 1: Model Overview 
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 Data 2.2.
We combine the natural gas and the electricity sector data for the base year 2010 and for the years 
2020, 2030, 2040, and 2050. Hourly data is used for a representative demand hour and the data input 
then varies in each of the scenarios. 
The natural gas data contains all European countries with one node per country and some more non-
EU countries that export natural gas to Europe. The nodes are linked with each other in a pipeline 
network and a virtual network of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trading routes between liquefiers (export-
ers) and regasifiers (importers). The pipeline network and LNG import capacities are based on 2010 
data by the European transmission system operators (ENTSO-G, 2010). For the periods beyond 2010, 
the 2012 capacity data by ENSO-G (ENTSO-G, 2012) and the Ten-Year Network Development Plan 
(TYNDP, ENTSO-G, 2011) were the basis to determine the capacities in place in the future. Liquefac-
tion capacities are given by the IEA (2012a) for 2010 and are derived from the IEA (2012b) for the pe-
riods thereafter. The related costs and losses parameters for pipelines, liquefaction, and regasification 
are based on the World Gas Model (Egging et al., 2010). PRIMES results for the Energy Modeling Fo-
rum 28 (EMF28) and the Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC, 2011) provide final demand and demand by the 
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electricity sector for natural gas, as well as reference prices for all periods. This yearly data for all EU-
27 countries, was scaled down to hourly data.  
The electricity model specifies the characteristics of generation technologies in terms of the heat effi-
ciency, emission coefficients and installed capacity for each technology at each node in the electricity 
grid. Furthermore, country-specific prices for the primary energy carriers, nuclear, lignite, hard coal 
and biomass, given by the PRIMES model results are used as fuel price inputs. The transmission grid 
is shown in Figure 2 and is based on the ENTSO-E Grid Map 2011 (ENTSO-E, 2011) and the grid ex-
tension projects described in the 2012 version of the ten-year network development plan (TYNDP) 
(ENTSO-E, 2012a). The grid for 2010 is taken from the ENTSO-E Grid Map 2011 without new built or 
planned projects. In the grid for 2020 all planned projects, as well as the mid-term grid extension pro-
jects (2012-2016) of the TYNDP, are added to the grid. The grids for 2030 and the following time steps 
additionally consist of the long-term TYNDP projects of pan-European significance. The grid structure 
in Figure 2 shows the 2030 AC-grid. For the model calculations, the electricity grid is aggregated into 
47 zones. Each zone consists of one or more NUTS1 (Nomenclature des unités territoriales statis-
tique) zones. 
Available technologies are clustered according to type.2 The technology characteristics of the different 
plant types (efficiency, availability, installed capacity) are based on the PRIMES results of the EMF28 
scenarios. The spatial distribution towards the different network zones is based on the Platts Database 
(Platts, 2011), from which each power plant’s geo-coordinates were determined. These power plant 
capacities were aggregated to the zones in the model. This allows for a regional allocation and scaling 
of the generation capacities reported for each country by the PRIMES model for each scenario and 
time period. Based on the technical potential for wind and solar provided by ESPON (2010), the na-
tional RES capacities provided by PRIMES are spatially allocated to the NUTS1 zones.  
The demand for electricity represents each country’s average winter demand. The yearly demand for 
electricity is taken from PRIMES and scaled with a summer/winter demand ratio determined from his-
torical demand values obtained from ENTSO-E (ENTSO-E, 2012b). These national values are spatial-
ly allocated to NUTS1 zones based on population share. For countries not reported by PRIMES (like 
Switzerland and Norway), assumptions regarding the development of renewable capacity expansion 
                                                     
2 Those are: Nuclear, Lignite, Lignite with CCS, Coal, Coal with CCS, Gas Combined Cycle, Gas Combined Cycle 
with CCS, Gas Turbines, Gas Turbines with CCS, Hydropower, Biomass, Photovoltaic (PV), Concentrated Solar 
Power (CSP), Wind Onshore and Wind Offshore 
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and electricity demand have been made based on renewable availability and the development of 
neighboring countries. 
 
Figure 2: Stylized natural gas network (left) and electricity network with zones (right) 
  
3. Basic Result Overview 
In a first step, we provide an overview on the development of the European natural gas and electricity 
markets until 2050. We analyze three of the EMF 28 scenarios in detail:3 
• 40%DEF: representing a "moderate policy" scenario with all default technology options availa-
ble, the EU`s 2020 targets in place, and a European 40% CO2 emission reduction target for 
2050, 
• 80%DEF: similar to the basic setting of 40%DEF but with a more stringent CO2 emission tar-
get of 80% until 2050 for Europe, 
• 80%GREEN: same target as the 80%DEF setting but with a higher share of “green” RES gen-
eration, stronger energy efficiency development and constrained usage of CCS and nuclear. 
The selected scenarios cover a diverse mix of potential developments and thus the simulated market 
results span a broad range. As the model is time-static, utilizes a reference hour approach, neglects 
                                                     
3 An overview of the aggregated results is provided in the Appendix. 
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global gas market interactions, and assumes perfectly competitive markets, the obtained results rep-
resent a lower boundary on expected market developments. 
Although the development paths are different, there are still some common trends for all scenarios: 
First, the market situation in 2010 has a similar pattern in all three settings.4 In the electricity market, 
there is a price separation of the Iberian Peninsula from the rest of Europe, a relatively uniform price 
level in Eastern Europe, a slightly higher price level in Central Europe and price spikes in Italy. Net-
work congestion occurs mainly at the French and German borders as well as on lines towards Italy. 
The average generation mix consists of nuclear, coal and RES (including hydro) to equal shares and 
about 10% of natural gas fired plants (Table 2). In the natural gas market, the absolute price level is 
different in the 40%DEF scenario due to the lower reference prices in 2010 but the spatial price and 
demand pattern is similar to the 80%DEF and 80%GREEN cases: Central Europe has a uniform price 
level supplied by Russian imports and North Sea gas from Norway and the Netherlands, South East 
Europe has a lower price level due to cheap Russian supplies and limited interconnection to Central 
Europe, and the Iberian Peninsula is decoupled and supplied by North African gas and LNG imports. 
The second common result over all scenarios is the general development of the natural gas market 
segmentation. Given the Nordstream connection from Russia to Germany, further extensions accord-
ing to the TYNDP within Europe, planned LNG extensions, and the assumed perfectly competitive 
market setting, network congestion plays only a minor role in the future European gas market and 
consequently we observe a relatively uniform price level across Europe for all cases. The price differ-
ences between the 40%DEF and 80%DEF/GREEN scenarios (Figure 3) are based on the different 
underlying reference prices. However, the demand development and the resulting production patterns 
differ greatly between the scenarios.  
For the electricity market, the projected extensions by ENTSOE`s TYNDP also lead to a price conver-
gence across Europe on average but the development varies even more by scenario than in the natu-
ral gas market. This is based on the different RES and nuclear assumptions that translate into different 
dispatch patterns (Table 2).5  
The main differences of the three scenarios stem from the underlying reference price levels. In the 
40%DEF setting, future fuel and electricity price assumptions are the highest, which translates into the 
                                                     
4 Note that the model uses the EMF28 PRIMES results for 2010 and not the observed market outcomes. 
5 A final similarity between all scenarios is the development of CCS generation. Due to the underlying emission 
price assumptions fossil generation without CCS has a severe cost disadvantage from 2030 onward and conse-
quently is phased out until 2050 as more CCS plants come online. 
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model results. The 40%DEF case shows both the highest absolute price levels of all cases and the 
only scenario with a steady price increase for both electricity and natural gas (Figure 3). The 
80%DEF/GREEN cases share the same underlying fuel price assumptions and also show a similar 
price development, particularly in the natural gas market. The electricity price development shows a 
curved pattern with a decline towards 2050. From 2030 onward, the 80%DEF price is above the 
80%GREEN price due to the different dispatch of RES and nuclear plants. In the 80%GREEN setting, 
nuclear plants phase out faster while the RES share strongly increases. The price decreasing effect of 
RES generation with low marginal costs leads to an electricity price decline to the lowest absolute lev-
els (Figure 3).6 However, as RES is not necessary located where the phased out nuclear plants were 
located, this increases transmission requirements which is evident by the high congestion rents in the 
80%GREEN 2050 case (Table 2).  
The lower prices in the 80%DEF/GREEN cases, compared to the 40%DEF scenario, also translate in-
to the demand level. Whereas the underlying reference demand for electricity declines in the former 
two cases and increases in the 40%DEF scenario (see Section 2.2), the model runs show a different 
demand development (Table 2). While the 40%DEF demand still grows over time, the increase is sig-
nificantly higher in the 80%DEF/GREEN scenarios. This is a result of the assumed demand elasticity 
and the obtained market prices. The higher share of RES generation and the lower reliance on con-
ventional power plants in the 80%DEF/GREEN scenarios lead to a low electricity price level and allow 
a higher satisfied demand than in the 40%DEF case. 
The usage of gas for electricity generation differs over time and the scenarios. In all cases, the highest 
share is obtained in 2020. This is a result of low natural gas prices coupled with the emission price 
that reduces the competiveness of coal plants. At the same time, RES and CCS capacities are not yet 
sufficient to fully cover the difference. From then on the share of gas plants declines to almost 0% in 
2050 in the 40%DEF and 80%GREEN scenarios and remains relatively stable with 10% in the 
80%DEF scenario. Despite the similar developments of the 40%DEF and 80%GREEN scenarios, the 
underlying reasons are strikingly different. In the 40%DEF case, nuclear and coal CCS plants continue 
to supply about 40% of electricity generation while the increased RES share is compensated by a de-
crease in gas fired generation. In the 80%GREEN scenario, nuclear and fossil generation are phased 
out and RES generation covers more than 90% of the demand in 2050.  
                                                     
6 The model results represent short-run marginal costs and thus do not account for investment cost recovery. 
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In the 80%DEF scenario, the situation is more diverse. While the deployment of RES and the phase 
out of nuclear plants are faster than in the 40%DEF setting, they are still slower than in the 
80%GREEN scenario. Thus, fossil generation still plays an important role in satisfying electricity de-
mand. However, due to the lower natural gas prices compared to the 40%DEF scenario (Table 1), gas 
fired CCS plants have a price advantage compared to coal CCS plants keeping the gas share at the 
10% level and phasing out coal. 
In the gas market, the development until 2050 reflects that the demand by power plants reduces to 0% 
until 2050 in the 40%DEF and 80%GREEN scenarios for an average reference hour. In the 80%DEF 
scenario, the share of electricity demand in the natural gas market increases until 2050 due to an in-
crease in the absolute gas fired generation output and a decline in overall gas demand. Interestingly, 
this indicates a reduction of demand by households (essentially for space heating) suggested by 
PRIMES. 
The domestic production within Europe, including Norway, declines to about 70% of the 2010 values 
over the decades. In the 40%DEF case, the relatively stable total gas demand is fuelled by increasing 
pipeline imports from Russia and the Caspian region while LNG imports from Nigeria and the Middle 
East decline. In the 80%DEF scenario, the gas demand declines to about 75% of its 2010 values until 
2050, 13% of which are for the electricity market. The low demand levels lead to a corresponding price 
decrease and shift in the supply pattern. Gas demand declines stronger in Central and East Europe, 
reducing the need for Russian gas. South Europe has a slower demand decrease, keeping imports 
from Africa and via LNG more pronounced. This development is accelerated in the 80%GREEN case 
as the general demand decrease in the natural gas sector is combined with the decline of gas usage 
in the electricity sector. This leads to a sharp reduction of imports both via LNG and pipeline until 2050 
while the demand level is reduced to about 55% of the 2010 values. These developments have an im-
pact on the import dependence of Europe: whereas the 40%DEF case has an import share of about 
71% in 2050, the 80%DEF has a share of about 65% and the 80%GREEN scenario a share of less 
than 50%. Thus, the higher environmental targets lead to less import dependency due to an overall 
reduction of gas demand. Hence, infrastructure bottlenecks will be no issue in the natural gas network 
after 2020. 
In sum, natural gas will only continue to play an important role in the energy system if CCS is delayed 
and/or nuclear power generation is phased out. Otherwise, coal with CCS has a cost-advantage over 
natural gas and renewables take increasingly large shares of electricity production. Our results confirm 
the mixed and ambiguous perspectives that others, like the European Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC, 
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2011b) and the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2012c), see for natural gas. Clearly, the technology 
choices will play a crucial role, as indicated by the scenario selection of the EMF28 group (Knopf et 
al., 2013). 
 
Figure 3: Price development, basic scenarios 
 
 
In summary, the basic results show that under average demand conditions network congestion is only 
a minor issue if the planned and projected pipeline, LNG, and transmission projects come online. The 
production and import pattern in the natural gas market remains similar to the setting currently ob-
served with a high dependency on Russian and African gas, but this dependency can be reduced by 
increases in energy efficiency and RES generation. The production pattern in electricity depends on 
the emission price, RES capacities and nuclear restrictions while coal and gas fired plants are more or 
less fill-ins. 
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4. Congestion and Dispatch in the future European Elec-
tricity Market 
The basic market results are computed for average market conditions. While this is appropriate for the 
natural gas transmission network as storage and pipeline operation allow a relatively stable wholesale 
market level7, the same does not hold for the electricity market. Depending on demand conditions and 
RES availability, the actual dispatch can vary heavily between hours and thereby lead to different 
power flows, locational prices, and network utilization patterns. To capture those aspects in the follow-
ing, we present a scenario analysis addressing peak demand and RES input variations. The analysis 
is carried out for 2010, 2030 and 2050 to derive the general trends.8  
 Impact of peak load conditions  4.1.
Electricity markets follow a daily demand pattern, with the highest demand usually around noon and in 
the evening and a significantly lower night-time demand. The peak demand hours can lead to an ag-
gravation of congestion in the network. We therefore focus on such a peak setting to analyze the re-
sulting price differences in Europe. We increase the demand level by 30% while keeping the same lin-
ear demand functionality as in the basic EMF scenarios.  
Not surprisingly, the demand increase during peak times leads to a higher price level. In 2010, we ob-
serve an about 23% higher price in all three scenarios. However, in 2030 and 2050, the price increase 
is more pronounced in the 80%DEF/GREEN scenarios (Table 3). This is a result of the different RES 
shares in the scenarios. As RES generation cannot be ramped up when demand increases, any in-
crease needs to be covered by conventional units. In the 40%DEF scenario, conventional units al-
ready cover a large share of demand under average conditions and consequently set market prices in 
most regions. During peak conditions, this setting does not change drastically. On the contrary, in the 
80%DEF/GREEN scenarios, the demand increase requires to ramp up conventional units in regions 
that could be satisfied with RES and nuclear generation under average conditions; consequently the 
                                                     
7 On the distribution level, the actual hourly gas demand does have significant impacts on network utilization 
though. However, we limit our analysis here to the high-pressure long-distance transmission network. 
8 The results are obtained by using the simulated natural gas market prices as fuel input prices for the electricity 
market model. 
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price increase is more pronounced. Nevertheless, the overall price level in the 80%DEF/GREEN sce-
narios is still lower under peak conditions in 2030 and 2050 than in the 40%DEF scenario. 
These aspects also translate into the overall network congestion level. Especially in 2050, the RES-
based 80%DEF/GREEN scenarios show a higher congestion rent in the system than the more fossil 
based 40%DEF scenario, despite the about 40% lower price level. This is due to the fact that the net-
work eventually limits the exchange between regions with excess RES supply and “import dependent” 
regions that need to switch to local conventional plants (Figure 4).  
The high share of fossil generation also sets the congestion development in the 2010 cases. As peak 
demand requires a ramp up of local fossil plants and RES and nuclear plants are already at their max-
imum output, the price in each region is equalized and thereby reduces the actual dependence on im-
port and export and the congestion rent. At the same time, the overall price level increases. 
 
Figure 4: Peak load price levels, 2050, 40%DEF and 80%GREEN 
 
 
 Impact of high RES injection 4.2.
Similar to the load (demand) dependence, the availability of RES generation also has a significant im-
pact on plant dispatch and network conditions. We focus on the influence of intermittent solar and 
wind production since biomass normally provides a base load profile. The two test cases represent a 
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high wind and solar input setting respectively, while demand and all other input parameters are kept at 
prior levels.9 
Due to the merit order effect the resulting market prices in case of high RES input are lower compared 
to the average market conditions (compare Table 2 and Table 4). As the wind capacities are larger 
than the solar capacities, the impact of a high wind case on market prices is larger. And since the 
80%DEF/GREEN scenarios have an overall larger increase of RES capacities compared to the 
40%DEF scenario, the impact of high RES availability is also more pronounced in those scenarios. 
A higher RES input also leads to a higher congestion rent in the system, as the geographically diverse 
input cannot be equalized within Europe, leading to RES induced low price regions versus high price 
regions depending on fossil generation. The exceptions are the 2010 scenarios, which show a slight 
decrease in congestion rent, and 2050 in the 80%GREEN case. In 2010, the RES share is still rather 
moderate and an increase in the availability helps to reduce import requirements for the high price re-
gions. In the 80%GREEN case in 2050, the share of RES is basically 100% and thereby all market 
prices are reduced to zero, which annihilates the potential to pay any congestion rents although there 
are still lines at their capacity limit.  
This case also highlights the ‘oversupply’ in the case of high RES availability in the 80%DEF/GREEN 
scenarios in the long run. Given the available capacities in both RES cases, a share of the RES gen-
eration cannot be accommodated by the system. In the 80%GREEN case, this is the most pro-
nounced with about 50% of the available wind and 30% of the solar generation not utilized in the ex-
ample cases (Table 4).10 
Given the higher installed wind capacities, it is not surprising to find that high wind availability leads to 
a more widespread price reduction than solar availability by 2030 (Figure 5). Due to its high wind 
share, the good geographical conditions for solar energy, and the limited transmission capacities to-
wards France, the Iberian Peninsula is a low price region in nearly all cases. The remainder of Europe 
shows a more diverse picture. In the high wind settings, Western Europe faces a significant price re-
duction due to its offshore capacities whereas in high solar settings the North does not benefit as 
much. 
                                                     
9 For the high wind input case, we assume an availability of onshore wind capacities of 70% and for offshore of 
90% compared to 20-25% for onshore and 35-38% for offshore in the basic scenarios. For solar, we assume an 
availability of 60% for photovoltaic systems and 80% for CSP plants. 
10 The model does not include a feed-in guarantee for RES generation, thereby limiting the impact on network 
congestion compared to current regulations in some European countries (e.g. Germany). 
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Figure 5: Electricity price levels, 2030, 40%DEF, high wind and solar injection 
 
 
Examining the load flow patterns in more detail, some trends can be identified. The average load level 
of the transmission lines declines until 2050 for all scenarios because of network expansions, accord-
ing to the TYNDP projects, and because of a higher share of local distributed generation. The wind 
cases show the highest load level, indicating the highest divergence between generation and demand 
regions. Finally, the peak load flow pattern is more or less an amplified version of the average load 
pattern for all scenarios. Congested lines are largely similar in all cases throughout the years.  
Under high wind conditions, particularly lines in and around Germany, the UK, and between Spain and 
France experience bottlenecks. This holds for all scenarios. On the contrary, high solar injection has 
different impacts depending on the underlying scenario. In the 40%DEF scenario, the resulting con-
gestion is similar to the average setting. This effect is largely based on the still relatively low share of 
solar based generation in relation to other types. Even in the 2050 case, only 30% of the RES injec-
tions come from solar in the high solar and about 70% of RES injections are from wind plants in the 
high wind case. 
In the 80%DEF scenarios, the increase in solar capacities and their impact on power flows is higher. 
This leads to higher stress of lines in Italy in addition to the congestion on Spanish connections. De-
spite the even higher installed solar capacities in the 80%GREEN scenario in 2050, the impact on 
power flows is reduced. This is due to the higher share of PV in all regions that reduces local demand 
and the need for trade.  
 17 
Summarizing the results for the electricity market, we can largely confirm the expected developments: 
the increase of RES generation leads to a price reduction due to lower marginal costs, the planned 
network extensions underway favor price convergence, and finally, although congestion remains an 
issue on some links until 2050 it will neither be more problematic than what we can observe in the cur-
rent market settings nor will it shift towards regions not already addressed in current extension plans. 
 
5. The Impact of the Gas Supply Interruptions on the Elec-
tricity System 
The basic results have already shown the interdependence of the European natural gas and electricity 
markets; e.g. the higher share of gas fired plants in the 80%DEF scenario keeps gas prices above the 
80%GREEN levels. In addition to this long term effect on prices, more short term impacts can also in-
fluence the plant dispatch and resulting market prices. Given the import dependence of the European 
natural gas market, changes in the supply situation can feed back into the electricity market.  
To test the robustness of the different scenarios with respect to external market shocks, we analyze 
two supply interruption cases: First, a supply stop from North African gas suppliers and second, a 
supply stop of Russian gas via the Ukraine and Belarus while direct connections to the EU remain 
open (i.e., Nordstream and South Stream). In the first shock, both the pipeline and the LNG exports 
are disrupted, simulating a similar situation than during the Arab Spring. This disruption will potentially 
have a strong effect on the South European importers, which rely on natural gas in their electricity 
generation and are hardly interconnected with the rest of the European natural gas network.11 The 
second shock reminds of the recurrent gas disputes between Russia and its transit countries Ukraine 
and Belarus (e.g. winter 2005/2006, winter 2008/2009). Given the strong dependence of East Europe-
an countries on natural gas imports from Russia and the lack of possibilities to import from other 
sources, such a shock is likely to have a high impact in East Europe. However, after the gas disputes 
of the last years, the installation of reverse flow capacities that allow for West-East gas flows (opposite 
the traditional direction from Russia to the West) has increasingly been undertaken and is included in 
the network dataset starting from 2020 on, based on current ENTSO-G planning (ENTSO-G, 2011). 
                                                     
11 See Lochner and Dieckhöhner (2012) for a disruption analysis of the North African suppliers focusing only on 
the natural gas sector. 
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Overall, the two supply shocks produce similar market reactions in the 2010 model period. The Rus-
sian interruption is more severe, as the Nordstream and South Stream options are not yet available. 
This effect is smaller in subsequent years as Russia simply bypasses its transition countries via the 
Baltic Sea (Nordstream) and the Black Sea (South Stream).12 On the other hand, the North African 
supply shock leads to a stronger decline in gas fired electricity generation as Spain has a high share 
of gas plants that depend on imports from Africa. 
In the future decades, the impact of the supply shock differs greatly between the three scenarios. In 
the 40%DEF scenario, the supply shocks always lead to a significant price increase on the natural gas 
market while electricity prices only experience a slight increase (Table 5). The latter is due to the rela-
tively low average share of gas fired plants in this scenario as coal units are more competitive, regard-
less of the gas supply condition. On the natural gas market, the demand decline is in the range of 3% 
to 5%. Overall, the shortage of Russian gas is less severe in 2030 and 2050 than the African supply 
cut. This is due to the fact that gas supplies from Africa are largely consumed in South Europe and 
thus can hardly be replaced by other trade options beside LNG imports. As the latter are already heav-
ily utilized under average conditions, a shortage of African supplies leaves South Europe with less gas 
to consume. On the other hand, the shortage of Russian gas via Belarus and the Ukraine leads to a 
reduction of availability in Eastern Europe which can partly be compensated by the reallocation of im-
ports in Central Europe. By increasing LNG imports in the UK and shifting Norwegian gas for the UK 
towards continental Europe, using Germany as a transit hub towards East and South East Europe, a 
large share of the disruption can be compensated for. 
In the 80%DEF scenario, the share of gas plants in the electricity dispatch is the highest and the im-
pact of a gas supply shortage on electricity markets is more distinctive than in the other two scenarios. 
In 2030, the gas consumption by the electricity sector falls by 80% and the electricity price increases 
by about 20% (Table 5). On the other hand, the demand on the natural gas markets (for other usages 
like heating and transportation) slightly increases after the supply cuts, utilizing some of the freed up 
electricity gas demand. However, the combined natural gas demand declines. Again, the UK plays a 
crucial role: its large share of gas-fired power plants, coupled with its great LNG capacities, and import 
pipelines from Norway allow a flexible switching to the benefit of the continental European market. By 
                                                     
12 See Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011) for a game-theoretic analysis of the strategic value of the direct pipelines to 
the West for the Russian bargaining position. Our results confirm this analysis that Russia has a strong incentive 
not only to threat the unreliable transit countries with direct links but to actually implement them. 
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freeing up LNG capacities (African case) or Norwegian imports (Russian case), they help to keep the 
impact on the European gas market moderate while their little interconnection with the continent limits 
feedback effects within the electricity network. In 2050, the overall gas demand has declined so far 
that a supply shock only induces small impacts in both markets. 
In the 80%GREEN setting, Europe’s gas demand is declining thereby reducing the impact of supply 
shocks. Similar to the 80%DEF scenario in 2030, both shocks lead to a decrease of gas consumption 
in the electricity sector and an increase of gas demand by other users (Table 5). The sum of both is 
still 4% lower than without the shock, but the case again highlights the interdependence of both mar-
kets. Looking in more detail at the electricity market, we can observe a clear distinction between both 
interruption cases. In case of a shortage from Africa, gas fired plants in South Europe and large parts 
of Western and Central Europe are shut down while Southeast Europe is continuously supplied via 
South Stream, limiting the price impact in that region (Figure 6). In the Russian case, mainly East and 
Central Europe are affected where most of the reallocation of gas supplies from Norway and Nord-
stream takes place. The Iberian peninsula, as well as Southeast Europe, are only slightly affected 
since their traditional supply lines (Africa for the former, South Stream for the latter) are not interrupted 
and their interconnection towards Central Europe is limited (Figure 6). 
Finally, in 2050, demand is so low and gas utilization in the electricity sector not relevant anymore and 
the existing infrastructure is capable to compensate both supply interruptions without significant price 
effects.  
 
Figure 6: Electricity prices in dependence of gas supply shock, 80%GREEN, 2030 
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6. Conclusions 
The interdependence between natural gas and electricity markets is a major characteristic of current 
energy markets in all regions of the world. In this paper, we have applied a model that looks at natural 
gas and electricity simultaneously to analyze the EMF 28 scenarios for European decarbonization at 
the horizon 2030/2050. The modeling approach of “combining” energy network markets leads to in-
sights that go beyond the traditional sector-specific approach. 
Summarizing the model simulations of the development of the European gas and electricity markets, 
we can draw some general conclusions. First, the planned extensions of the existing network infra-
structure, both in the electricity and gas system, will help to keep congestion on moderate levels on 
average. However, the timing of those extensions and the actual scale of the projects, especially in the 
electricity network, is uncertain. Experiences with current extension projects show long timeframes un-
til the projects are finally realized (e.g. the Austrian extension of the 380kV ring) and increasing re-
sistance to new projects (the NIMBY problem). So, if some of the assumed extensions are delayed or 
cancelled, then the congestion situation is likely to be more pronounced than in our simulations. 
Second, although the European natural gas market will remain dependent on imports, the supply situ-
ation is rather comfortable and congestion plays only a minor role. This is especially true with the 
Nordstream pipeline which helps to increase the availability of gas in Central Europe and leads to an 
equalization of prices throughout Europe.  
Third, the future European electricity supply tends to be less carbon-intensive. Regardless of the un-
derlying scenario, if the 2050 emission targets are to be kept, fossil plants without CCS will phase out. 
However, even if CCS options are in place, the increasing share of RES will gradually push those to 
the margin. The crucial question is the timing of this process and not the eventual phasing out of con-
ventional generation in the long run. 
This development has a central impact on the gas market. In case of ambitious environmental policies 
and a fast RES deployment (80%GREEN), the role of gas is gradually minimized and frees up the gas 
infrastructure capacities for increased gas demand in other sectors, such as transportation. However, 
given stringent emission restrictions, these demand options may not be attractive and we may face 
excess capacity in the gas sector. If the environmental restrictions are only gradually tightened and 
RES deployment grows moderately (40%DEF), fossil generation will play a more prominent role in the 
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electricity market. Under those conditions, gas has to compete with coal if CCS technologies become 
available, nullifying the low emission advantage of gas.13 The shares of different fuels then strongly 
depend on the market prices of these fuels. Finally, in an in-between situation (80%DEF), gas may in-
deed play an important role as the emission policy can lead to a lower total gas consumption and 
thereby lower gas prices in Europe. At the same time, the RES deployment is not fast enough to ren-
der fossil fuels obsolete until 2050. Given this framework, gas plants can benefit from low prices in Eu-
rope which may increase their share in generation compared to CCS coal plants. 
In conclusion, we can say that the future development of natural gas in Europe will be determined by 
the general political framework while locational aspects due to the network structure play ‘only’ a sec-
ondary role. However, this general framework still provides a wide range of potential development 
paths. 
Like all simulations, the presented results strongly depend on the underlying scenario assumptions 
and model restrictions. Those can lead to an underestimation of the role of gas in the electricity market 
and thereby an underestimation of the interaction. The time-static nature of the model and the average 
demand conditions simulated, in particular, can lead to an underestimation of gas demand in the elec-
tricity sector. This also includes the unit commitment and ramping restrictions of power plants. Similar-
ly, the deterministic nature of the model neglects the high volatility of RES injection and a potential in-
crease of balancing needs. All those aspects can lead to a higher influence of gas fired electricity pro-
duction than anticipated in this paper.  
The regional clustering in zones in both markets can also bias the results, as local congestion is ne-
glected. Interestingly, we find a congestion effect of RES despite the high zonal aggregation level. Our 
results can be complemented by the nodal approach taken in Egerer et al. (2013) that investigate the 
same scenarios. Our model could be improved by using a nodal aggregation (electricity model) or at 
least further disaggregated zones (e.g. gas market zones in some countries). However, there are cur-
rently computational limits to a detailed disaggregation.  
Similarly, the scaling of future generation capacities based on the current plant distribution has a sig-
nificant impact on power flows, especially with a long term perspective of 40 years in which most 
plants will have to be replaced. Given future developments in congestion pricing, one can assume that 
                                                     
13 The higher flexibility of gas plants is still an advantage but given the foreseeable increase in wind and solar 
forecast reliability this will become less important in day-ahead dispatch decision and be limited to balancing ser-
vice. 
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at least a part of newly installed conventional capacities will not be constructed at current locations but 
in high prices regions and thereby reduce system congestion. Regarding the resulting price levels, the 
assumption of perfect competition results in a potential downward bias and the obtained results repre-
sent a lower bound.  
The gas market model is Europe-centered and neglects interactions with the US and Asian gas mar-
kets. This can lead to a price underestimation (e.g. if LNG demand by Asia is strong) or an overesti-
mation (e.g. if increasing shale gas from the US lowers global prices). Since the partial market repre-
sentation lacks a cross-price elasticity between the fuels, the natural gas demand does not react di-
rectly to low electricity prices via end use fuel substitution and only captures the impact of changes in 
the dispatch of gas fired power plants. Price changes due to variations in the consumption of coal are 
also not included, which could lead to a further demand decrease or increase in the natural gas sector. 
Finally, the emission permit price is exogenous to the model. Thus, resulting plant dispatch decisions 
have no feedback effect on the price and investments are externally defined and do not react to poten-
tial price changes due to changes in prices or dispatch. Future research should address all the meth-
odological issues mentioned. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Basic market results, natural gas 
 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
40%DEF 
Price [€/MWh] 19.58 19.91 21.57 24.60 28.72 
Gas Demand [GW] 801.10 834.96 813.67 798.14 780.46 
Elec. Gas Demand [GW] 61.32 79.87 24.80 17.43 11.31 
Pipeline Import [GW] 319.52 367.46 390.16 402.64 425.10 
LNG Import [GW] 204.93 259.53 191.87 171.22 137.51 
EU Production [GW] 337.97 287.82 256.44 241.70 229.15 
80%DEF 
Price [€/MWh] 25.89 16.85 16.76 16.30 14.57 
Gas Demand [GW] 820.63 789.38 762.21 707.61 572.40 
Elec. Gas Demand [GW] 47.45 91.45 83.99 82.80 87.61 
Pipeline Import [GW] 321.60 361.25 375.84 347.36 253.95 
LNG Import [GW] 208.42 228.18 207.34 199.98 177.30 
EU Production [GW] 338.06 291.40 263.01 243.07 228.77 
80%GREEN 
Price [€/MWh] 26.01 16.89 16.82 13.84 12.13 
Gas Demand [GW] 821.43 791.61 733.63 637.60 481.17 
Elec. Gas Demand [GW] 47.56 93.22 82.75 16.39 1.74 
Pipeline Import [GW] 322.13 364.10 357.35 242.13 161.16 
LNG Import [GW] 208.80 227.78 198.49 166.45 87.88 
EU Production [GW] 338.06 292.95 260.54 245.41 233.87 
Table 2: Basic market results, electricity 
 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
40%DEF 
Price [€/MWh] 31.60 39.79 47.45 48.00 49.68 
Demand [GW] 323.27 359.24 360.39 383.13 408.76 
Congestion Rent [mn/h] 0.29 0.12 0.02 0.23 0.19 
RES Share 29% 44% 56% 59% 59% 
Gas Share 10% 12% 4% 2% 1% 
Coal Share 29% 15% 12% 10% 10% 
Nuclear Share 32% 28% 28% 29% 30% 
CCS Share of fos. Gen. 0% 2% 11% 98% 98% 
80%DEF 
Price [€/MWh] 32.91 37.09 44.14 34.26 24.91 
Demand [GW] 324.76 371.43 369.62 445.56 483.67 
Congestion Rent [mn/h] 0.48 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.07 
RES Share 30% 46% 63% 67% 71% 
Gas Share 8% 14% 13% 10% 10% 
Coal Share 28% 13% 0% 3% 3% 
Nuclear Share 34% 27% 23% 19% 17% 
CCS Share of fos. Gen. 0% 2% 3% 100% 100% 
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80%GREEN 
Price [€/MWh] 33.38 37.04 38.20 33.07 15.56 
Demand [GW] 323.49 370.92 392.70 452.80 502.14 
Congestion Rent [mn/h] 0.50 0.10 0.05 0.14 0.60 
RES Share 30% 46% 67% 85% 94% 
Gas Share 8% 14% 12% 2% 0% 
Coal Share 29% 13% 2% 1% 1% 
Nuclear Share 33% 27% 18% 12% 5% 
CCS Share of fos. Gen. 0% 2% 2% 100% 100% 
 
Table 3: Load impact on electricity markets 
 40%DEF 80%DEF 80%GREEN 
Load Condition: Average Peak Average Peak Average Peak 
2010: 
Price [€/MWh] 31.60 38.87 32.91 40.83 33.38 41.16 
Demand [GW] 323.27 399.65 324.76 398.48 323.49 397.86 
Congestion Rent [mn/h] 0.29 0.20 0.48 0.36 0.50 0.35 
Conventional/RES-Ratio 71/29 77/23 70/30 76/24 70/30 76/24 
2030: 
Price [€/MWh] 47.45 56.59 44.14 55.95 38.20 48.30 
Demand [GW] 360.39 457.89 369.62 454.75 392.70 482.57 
Congestion Rent [mn/h] 0.02 0.21 0.04 0.24 0.05 0.13 
Conventional/RES-Ratio 44/56 56/44 36/63 48/52 32/67 46/54 
2050: 
Price [€/MWh] 49.68 63.55 24.91 36.35 15.56 37.25 
Demand [GW] 408.76 499.88 483.67 577.55 502.14 568.11 
Congestion Rent [mn/h] 0.19 0.42 0.07 0.42 0.60 1.63 
Conventional/RES-Ratio 41/59 52/48 30/71 40/60 6/94 14/86 
 
Table 4: RES impact on electricity markets 
 40%DEF 80%DEF 80%GREEN 
High RES Injection: Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar 
2010: 
Price [€/MWh] 29.66 31.05 30.80 32.35 30.96 32.94 
Congestion Rent [mn/h] 0.29 0.28 0.36 0.46 0.37 0.49 
Un-dispatched RES  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2030: 
Price [€/MWh] 26.69 43.77 17.44 39.60 11.45 29.64 
Congestion Rent [mn/h] 0.45 0.19 0.60 0.32 0.85 0.23 
Un-dispatched RES  0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 0% 
2050: 
Price [€/MWh] 25.04 39.38 7.37 12.17 0.00 1.36 
Congestion Rent [mn/h] 0.48 0.40 0.72 0.35 0.00 0.08 
Un-dispatched RES  0% 0% 13% 3% 48% 29% 
 
 26 
Table 5: Impact of shocks in the natural gas market 
 40%DEF 80%DEF 80%GREEN 
Gas Shortage: None Africa Russia None Africa Russia None Africa Russia 
2010: 
Gas Price [€/MWh] 19.6 25.5 32.1 25.9 34.8 43.8 26.0 35.0 44.0 
Gas Demand [GW] 801.1 746.6 645.0 820.6 750.5 649.3 821.4 750.3 648.7 
El. Gas Dem. [GW] 61.3 6.4 35.4 47.4 6.6 36.5 47.6 6.9 34.3 
Elec. Price [€/MWh] 31.6 36.6 34.8 32.9 36.1 34.3 33.4 36.4 34.6 
2030: 
Gas Price [€/MWh] 21.6 31.8 28.9 16.7 22.7 23.6 16.8 19.3 19.5 
Gas Demand [GW] 813.7 777.4 791.1 762.2 774.4 769.5 733.6 758.7 749.5 
El. Gas Dem. [GW] 24.8 9.7 8.9 84.0 15.7 15.7 82.7 24.1 36.7 
Elec. Price [€/MWh] 47.5 49.8 49.9 44.1 51.9 51.6 38.2 42.3 41.1 
2050: 
Gas Price [€/MWh] 28.7 40.8 41.5 14.6 15.3 15.3 12.1 12.4 12.2 
Gas Demand [GW] 780.5 748.0 750.0 572.4 573.8 578.8 481.2 480.3 480.9 
El. Gas Dem. [GW] 11.3 3.0 2.46 87.6 79.8 67.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Elec. Price [€/MWh] 49.7 50.6 50.6 24.9 25.9 27.3 15.6 15.6 15.6 
 
 
